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On 16 and 17 June 2005, the ECB has hosted a Conference on “What Effects is EMU Having on the Euro Area and its 
Member Countries?” One and a half decade after the start of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and more 
than six years after the launch of the euro, the aim of the conference was to assess what can be learned about the impact of 
economic and monetary integration and how it has benefited the euro area and its member countries. 
 
The conference brought together academics, central bankers and policy makers to discuss the existing empirical evidence on 
changes brought about, either directly or indirectly, by EMU and, in particular, the introduction of the euro in five main areas:  
Area 1.  Trade integration;  
Area 2.  Structural reforms in product and labour markets;  
Area 3.  Financial integration;  
Area 4.  Business cycles synchronisation and economic specialisation; and  
Area 5.  Inflation persistence and inflation differentials.  
 
Lead presenters for each of the aforementioned areas had been asked to put together - and interpret - all the available 
information, flag any open questions, and also discuss the implications in their respective field of expertise. With the benefit of 
hindsight, lead presenters and discussants have also addressed some initial presumptions with the evidence that has 
accumulated thus far.   
 
In order to exchange information and ideas on the above effects, and increase mutual awareness of ongoing work in the diverse 
areas, we deemed it useful to issue the five leading presentations, together with the accompanying discussions, in the ECB 
Working Paper Series.  
 
 
       Otmar Issing                                       Francesco Paolo Mongelli                                   Juan Luis Vega 
  Member of the Executive Board                          Conference Organiser                                Conference Organiser 3
ECB




Non-technical abstract  5
1. Introduction 6
2. Output heterogeneity within the euro area 7
2.1 Synchronization of output levels,
growth rates and recessions 7
2.2. What drives asymmetries: shocks or
propagations? 12
3. The euro area and the world 14
4. Business cycle asymmetries and risk sharing:
should we care about output synchronization? 20
5. Conclusions 23
References 24
Comments by Bent E. Sørensen 27
1 Convergence of output 27
2 Decline in output volatility 28
3 U.S. versus European business cycles 30
4 Risk sharing 31
References 34
Figures 35
Comments by Mary McCarthy 37
References 44
European Central Bank Working Paper Series 45Abstract
Not so much and we should not, at least not yet.
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The paper analyzes output dynamics in Euro area countries in the last thirty
years. It establishes robust stylized facts on output di®erentials within the union,
on the synchronization of recessions within the area countries and on similarities
and di®erences with respect to the US case. Finally, it provides estimates of
changes in the degree of risk sharing since the early nineties.
The paper ¯nds that, since 1970, within the Euro area, gaps in levels of
income per capita have been persistent. This implies that it is di±cult to distin-
guish convergence patterns from persistent °uctuations around di®erent means.
However, these gaps are small and business cycle characteristics, when measured
by levels of output, have been very similar across countries. Output variance,
the paper ¯nds, is mainly explained by common shocks with similar propagation
mechanisms while idiosyncratic shocks, although persistent, are small. These
characteristics are in line with what found for US regions.
An implication of this result is that policy should be concerned with the
common characteristic of the European cycle. The next step of the analysis is
then to compare the characteristics of the Euro area cycle with the US cycle. It
is found that the two cycles are driven by a common world shock, but that the
propagation of the shock di®ers across the two areas: the Euro Area lags the
US and its cycle is more persistent, but less volatile. Low growth, persistence of
shocks and low volatility are common characteristics of the Euro area and the
gap with respect to the US has been stable over the last thirty years.
Facing these historical characteristics, the process of European integration,
has however helped to smooth the cross-sectional correlation of consumption con-
ditional on output. This ¯nding supports the hypothesis that, since the early
nineties, risk sharing has increased within the Euro Area.
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Recently, the policy discussion has focused on heterogeneity of economic performance of
countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU). The mechanisms through which the
lack of °exibility based on national exchange rate and monetary policy may exacerbate
the e®ect of shocks is well known (see Mundell, 1961, and subsequent literature) and
the potential e®ect of common monetary policy on increasing divergence of economic
performance between countries belonging to the union have been widely debated in the
late nineties.
Now, six years after the establishment of the monetary union, with some real obser-
vations to analyze and with the Euro Area facing unsatisfactory growth performance,
the debate is having a second life. Heterogeneity is indeed the subject of this conference.
This paper looks at this issue from a narrow point of view. We analyze output
dynamics in member countries in the last thirty years and try to establish robust stylized
facts on output di®erentials within the union, the synchronization of recessions and the
relation with respect to the US. Recent developments, we argue, have to be understood
within the broader picture of the historical behavior of the European countries business
cycle and their relation with the US. The ambition of the paper is to organize the results
of a large empirical literature and bring some new evidence on our own to provide an
understanding of the stylized facts.
This analysis leads us to the following results. Output di®erentials, both in term of
levels and growth rate, have been remarkably stable over the last thirty years. However,
the business cycle have shown a high degree of synchronization: recessions have occurred
at similar dates and cross-country correlations have been stable and in line with those
found amongst US regions.
An analysis of the shocks suggests that heterogeneity is explained by small, but per-
sistent idiosyncratic shocks while output °uctuations are mainly explained by common
Euro Area shocks with similar propagation mechanisms. This indicates that the roots
of recent heterogeneity has to be found in national shocks, such as policies, for example,
that have a long lasting e®ect, but that are small when compared with common forces
of variation.
Our ambition is not structural here and this evidence is meant to provide food for
thought for a deeper analysis. Any structural analysis will have to match these two
facts: common dynamics and small and persistent idiosyncratic shocks. Persistence of
gaps in output per capita is explained, for Euro Area core countries, such as Germany,
France and Belgium by very long swings in the gap while for other countries, such as
Ireland, by convergence e®ects. Given the short sample we base this analysis on, it is
di±cult to assess whether, since the early nineties, with the deepening of the European
integration, convergence e®ects dominate.
When the Euro Area is analyzed as a whole and in combination with the US, it
appears that the two currency areas have a large component of their output °uctuations
in common. Fluctuations are generated by a world shock originating in the US, a shock
that Europe absorbs with a lag and with a response which is less volatile, but more
persistent. This is food for thought for a deeper understanding of international linkages:
what explains the di®erence between growth performance of the Euro and the US does
6
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line with the literature that emphasized the importance of world shocks (eg. Kose
et al., 2003; Canova et al., 2004). However, it quali¯es that result showing US-Euro
Area di®erences in the propagation mechanism to the common shocks.
In the last part of the paper, we turn to the analysis of recent changes and we
ask whether, in faces of the output development just described, we have observed a
higher degree of risk sharing and therefore a higher degree of consumption cross-country
correlations conditionally on output. Our analysis follows Asdrubali et al. (1996) and
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2004). It points to evidence of a higher degree of risk sharing
which leads us then to conclude that EMU, and more generally European integration,
seems to have worked in the right direction. Obviously, whether this process will
eventually lead to higher growth in the aggregate is still unclear, but the understanding
of this link should be in the research agenda.
2 Output heterogeneity within the Euro Area
2.1 Synchronization of output levels, growth rates and
recessions
The literature has analyzed synchronization from di®erent points of views: levels,
growth rates, the unravelling particular episodes such as recessions, by using data
¯ltered so as to capture business cycle frequencies. However, not much has been done
to try to connect the ¯ndings from the di®erent perspectives. In this section we will
try to ¯ll this gap.
Level gaps
A ¯rst natural measure of asymmetry can be de¯ned looking at the di®erence between
output per capita in a member country and the average in the Euro Area.
De¯ne yi
t £ 100 as the log of real GDP per-capita of country (region) i in year t







is de¯ned as the percentage deviation of real GDP per-capita of country (region) i with
respect to the aggregate Euro Area (US) GDP per-capita.











Working Paper Series No. 595
March 2006
result is based on a more detailed analysis in Giannone and Reichlin (2005) and is inTable 1: Per-capita GDP at PPP and 2000 prices: gap with respect to Euro Area
AVE AVE AVE
1970 1980 1990 1999 2003 70-03 70-89 90-03 AR1
AT 6.32 13.13 12.88 16.49 15.67 13.18 11.90 15.01 0.81 *
BE 5.05 8.51 6.16 7.00 7.00 6.81 7.02 6.52 0.51 **
FI -2.00 2.89 7.77 3.57 8.05 2.54 3.77 0.78 0.88 *
FR 10.76 9.81 7.92 4.83 5.05 8.38 10.35 5.56 0.98
GE 5.54 4.55 5.04 3.63 1.53 4.47 4.15 4.92 0.90
GR -29.51 -21.33 -40.63 -41.28 -30.79 -31.85 -26.07 -40.12 0.94
IE -44.63 -40.13 -28.50 10.40 23.84 -25.72 -40.71 -4.30 1.07
IT 1.74 4.94 5.91 2.86 2.26 3.88 3.69 4.14 0.93
LU 34.23 25.07 47.79 65.91 72.24 43.60 31.86 60.37 1.04
NL 17.73 10.73 6.47 11.85 8.58 10.38 11.47 8.82 0.90
PT -57.78 -50.34 -40.59 -33.55 -37.06 -45.04 -50.65 -37.01 0.92
SP -25.61 -27.73 -23.23 -17.25 -13.64 -22.65 -24.68 -19.75 1.01
EU12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 31.80 19.43 13.78 16.26 15.57 19.90 23.23 15.15 0.88
SE 24.73 13.29 11.15 8.96 11.34 13.03 16.82 7.63 0.88
UK 6.71 -2.64 0.90 4.27 7.59 2.26 2.00 2.65 0.84
EU15 2.31 0.23 0.62 1.14 1.73 1.01 1.13 0.84 0.81
US 36.31 30.35 31.95 35.54 35.48 33.38 33.62 33.04 0.66 **
CA 19.48 18.73 12.79 12.89 15.98 15.93 19.25 11.20 0.90
JP -4.04 0.20 12.35 7.20 6.79 5.20 1.46 10.54 0.92
OECD 3.72 -0.13 0.84 1.58 1.94 1.43 1.70 1.04 0.61 **
The last column denotes the results from an ADL test for unit root.





The gap observed today (t+h) in a given country then depends on its initial (time t)
relative condition and growth performance in the past years up to today (t+1;:::;t+h).
We ask two main empirical questions. Do gaps persist in time? Have countries
changed their relative position?
Table 1 reports the gaps for Euro countries in the last 30 years. We also report gaps
for the US, Japan (JP), Canada (CA), and, respectively, the Euro twelve (EU12)1, the
European Union with the 15 members preceding the 2004 enlargement (EU15)2, and
the OECD countries for comparisons.
Table 2 reports the same gap statistics for the real personal income of US regions
with respect to the US average.3 We consider the following regions: New England
(NE),Mideast (ME), Great Lakes (GL), Plains (PL), Southeast (SE), Southwest (SW),
Rocky Mountain (RM), Far West (FW).
Table 1 shows that the gaps, with the exception of Ireland, have been remarkably
stable in the last thirty years. These gaps are also very persistent and there is no clear
sign of convergence to a common level of output per capita (again with the exception
of Ireland).
1Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (GE), Greece GR, Ire-
land (IR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherland (NE), Portugal (PT) and Spain (SP).
2EU12 plus Denmark (DE), Sweden (SE) and United Kingdom (UK).
3The use of personal income in Table 2 rather than GDP as in Table 1 will lead us to over-
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*Table 2: Per-capita Personal Income: Gap of US region with respect to US ag-
gregate
AVE AVE AVE
1970 1980 1990 1999 2003 70-03 70-89 90-03 AR1
US 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NE 8.45 4.97 15.37 17.03 19.02 11.50 7.98 16.53 1.00
ME 12.11 7.55 14.88 13.02 13.20 11.50 10.09 13.52 0.96
GL 2.61 1.70 -1.93 -0.08 -1.40 0.53 1.36 -0.67 0.94
PL -6.18 -5.66 -7.17 -4.40 -3.15 -4.47 -4.21 -4.83 0.55
SE -20.65 -15.65 -12.05 -10.99 -10.02 -13.61 -15.69 -10.64 0.92
SW -12.56 -4.30 -13.26 -10.41 -10.69 -9.69 -8.60 -11.24 0.91
RM -8.21 -3.04 -11.35 -5.83 -4.33 -6.59 -6.24 -7.07 0.93
FW 13.58 14.36 8.29 5.39 4.47 9.16 11.86 5.30 0.98
The last column denotes the results from an ADL test for unit root.
*, **, and *** indicate if the Unit Root is rejected at 10% and 5 % and 1% level respectively
A formal unit root test, whose results are shown in the last column, indicates that
for most European countries we cannot reject the hypothesis that the gap is non-
stationary and that therefore there is no common trend along which these economies
move.
Persistence in the gaps is generated by low frequency cycles around di®erent means
and, in the case of Ireland by a convergence trend. Given the persistence of the gaps
it is di±cult to distinguish whether, since the EMU, countries such as Spain or Greece
have been moving along a convergence path or are just in a phase of a long swing.
In general, on the basis of data so far, there is no clear evidence that the EMU has
modi¯ed the historical dynamics.4
To put these ¯ndings in a broader context, it is useful to look at the gap between
the US and the Euro Area average (Table 1) and the US regions and the US aggregate
(Table 2). From Table 2, we can see that the gaps between US regions and the US
aggregate, like the gaps between Euro Area countries and the Euro Area average are
non-stationary while, from Table 1, we had found that the gap between the US and
the Euro Area is. This fact suggests that it is indeed more likely for large economic
a period of thirty years. Averaging output over nations/regions \kills" idiosyncratic
°uctuations, no matter whether they are persistent or not. To understand the economic
importance of this ¯nding, however, we need to estimate the size of this idiosyncratic
dynamic. This is what we will do in the next Section.
Growth gaps




4A separate literature has studied convergence dynamics within the Euro area (eg, Harvey
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entities, which by virtue of size are well diversi¯ed,  to move along a similar path overhave declined over time and, in the last ten years, has reached an historical low (see
Table 3, column 1). This is not true, however, if we look at correlations between coun-
try's growth and Euro average growth, Corr(¢yi
t;¢yEU
t ). Since, as observed by many
studies (see Stock and Watson, 2005, for a review of the literature and an analysis based
on the G7), the variance of output per capita has decreased everywhere, a phenomenon
that has been labelled the \great moderation", correlations are more stable than the
variance of the gaps.
Table 3 reports variances of GDP growth rates, variances of the growth gap and cor-
relations between our selected countries and Euro Area GDP growth rates, for di®erent
sub-samples.
Table 3: GDP growth rate for OECD countries: descriptive statistics
(1) Var(¢yi
t ¡ ¢yEU




71-03 71-89 93-03 71-03 71-89 93-03 71-03 71-89 93-03
AT 1.24 1.96 0.38 2.86 3.56 1.32 0.76 0.68 0.84
BE 0.71 1.01 0.43 3.16 3.97 1.44 0.88 0.87 0.84
FI 7.31 3.57 1.17 8.46 3.79 2.18 0.38 0.43 0.68
FR 0.38 0.43 0.15 1.91 1.90 1.14 0.91 0.90 0.93
GE 0.71 0.64 0.06 2.91 2.79 0.94 0.87 0.88 0.97
GR 9.07 13.21 2.29 10.94 16.85 1.04 0.41 0.48 -0.20
IE 8.66 6.00 3.57 8.25 4.92 6.43 0.20 0.18 0.79
IT 0.88 1.19 0.26 3.21 3.97 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.85
LU 7.17 8.74 4.56 10.95 14.58 7.20 0.62 0.70 0.70
NL 1.03 1.01 0.90 2.49 2.69 2.69 0.78 0.80 0.87
PT 6.65 10.25 2.04 13.05 18.62 4.09 0.82 0.82 0.77
SP 2.00 3.15 0.24 4.05 5.71 0.87 0.71 0.67 0.86
EU12 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.05 2.29 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00
DE 2.72 3.53 1.07 3.58 5.02 1.70 0.54 0.56 0.62
SE 3.32 3.50 0.52 3.36 2.13 1.82 0.40 0.21 0.86
UK 3.21 3.22 0.44 3.81 5.10 0.63 0.47 0.61 0.71
EU15 0.10 0.10 0.01 1.85 2.21 0.77 0.97 0.98 0.99
US 3.25 3.69 1.03 4.16 5.83 1.33 0.51 0.61 0.54
CA 3.68 2.59 0.96 4.57 4.31 2.13 0.48 0.64 0.75
JP 3.32 3.16 3.41 4.47 4.37 2.19 0.53 0.55 -0.13
OECD 0.85 0.85 0.48 1.90 2.60 0.68 0.79 0.83 0.69
To control for the e®ects of the German uni¯cation, we do not include the period 1990-1992
in the sub-samples.
The table shows that cyclical co-movements, measured by correlations have been
high and stable within the Euro Area and between the Euro Area and the rest of the
world.
business cycle using di®erent measures and with the literature on the world business
cycle which has found that the international component of output °uctuations explain
a large part of total volatility (e.g. Kose et al., 2003; Artis et al., 2004; Canova et al.,
2004; Monfort et al., 2004). Simple correlation coe±cients, however, show that co-
movements within the Euro Area, are higher than between the Euro Area and the rest
of the world. This indicates that the Area wide aggregate captures the bulk of national
features and that we can identify speci¯c characteristics of the Euro Area business
cycle. This justi¯es the analysis of the aggregate European business cycle with respect
to the US which we carry on in Section 4.
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This ¯nding is in line with Stock and Watson (2005) who analyze the internationalRecessions
Recessions are very informative events. In \normal times" volatility is relatively low
while a recession is a major event, characterized by an unusual drop in output. Are
Euro Area recessions synchronized? Harding and Pagan (2004) have recently proposed
an adaptation of the automatic algorithm designed by Bry and Boschan (1971) to
identify peaks and through of the European recessions of the last thirty years 5. Figure
1 reports their resulting dating for the Euro area and its largest member countries.
Figure 1: Euro Area Classical Reference Cycle and speci¯c cycles in GDP for
The Figure shows that peaks and troughs of European countries business cycles are
basically concomitant.
Summing up
An apparent paradox emerges from a ¯rst look at the economic performances of Eu-
ropean countries: looking at levels of economic activity we would be led to think that
di®erences between countries are persistent while looking at growth rates or at the
chronology of the business cycle we ¯nd strong similarities. The explanation is that
cyclical asymmetries when measured in terms of levels of output, although persistent,
are small and in line with those between US regions.
In the next sub-section we will analyze the sources of asymmetries in more details.
5The Bry-Boschan algorithm is a non-parametric procedure deviced to identify local maxima
and minima and it is widely used in business cycle analysis.
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individual Euro Countries (Source: Harding and Pagan,  2004)2.2 What drives asymmetries: shocks or propagations?
Heterogeneous dynamics can be explained either by the exogenous sources of variation,
i.e. idiosyncratic,
shocks. Which is the explanation for the heterogeneity found within the Euro Area?
To analyze this question, we estimate a set of bivariate structural VARs on output
per capita of country i and the Euro area average. The identi¯cation assumption is
that the country speci¯c shock a®ects the other member countries with a lag, one year,
i.e. we assume that spillover e®ects take at least one year to manifest6.
We will use the US as the usual benchmark and redo the exercise using regional

































where pi is the relative size of country (region) i measured as the ratio between county
(region) i population and the total population of the Euro Area (United States)7. As
uAV
t is the Euro Area Wide (US wide) shock while ui
t is the country (region) i speci¯c
shock8.
To understand which shocks are responsible for the asymmetries we will look at the
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; h = 1;3;5
Euro Area
Table 4 below shows forecast error decompositions related to these two quantities for
the Euro Area.
6A similar identi¯cation strategy has been used by Stock and Watson (2005) to identify
country speci¯c and world-wide shocks among G7 countries.
7We use average population over the sample period 1970-2003.
8The VAR is estimated in levels to be robust with respect to unit root issues. Impulse
responses will be then computed for a medium run horizon.
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country-speci¯c shocks, or by heterogenous responses to common












h=0 h=1 h=3 h=5 h=0 h=1 h=3 h=5
AT 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.42 0.30 0.17 0.11
BE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.24 0.14 0.10 0.11
FI 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.84
FR 0.76 0.74 0.69 0.66 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.10
GE 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.39
GR 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.84
IE 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.82
IT 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.41
LU 0.78 0.76 0.71 0.67 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.36
NL 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38
PT 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.27
SP 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66
From the Table we can see that the gap is mainly explained by country speci¯c
shocks at all horizons. The latter, however, have had a limited role in explaining
output °uctuations, particularly at medium term horizon. Three exceptions stand out:
Greece, Finland and Ireland.
A further exercise is to run a counterfactual exercise and ask what would have
correlation been in the absence of country speci¯c shocks. Table 5 below provides the
answer.
Table 5: Counterfactual correlations
TRUE Only Area Only Country
Wide Shocks speci¯c Shocks
AT 0.76 0.94 0.20
BE 0.88 0.97 0.32
FI 0.38 0.96 0.07
FR 0.91 0.97 0.21
GE 0.87 0.88 0.35
GR 0.41 0.90 0.16
IE 0.20 0.34 -0.12
IT 0.85 0.98 0.31
LU 0.62 0.81 -0.11
NL 0.78 0.97 0.08
PT 0.82 0.99 0.15
SP 0.71 0.97 0.18
Clearly, correlations would have been quite high and stable if there had been only
area-wide shocks which implies that asymmetries are explained by idiosyncratic shocks
rather than heterogeneous responses to common shocks and that, therefore, area wide
shocks propagate similarly across Euro Area countries (with the exception of Ireland).
Again we ¯nd that, although small, national factors have persistent e®ects. Com-
mon Euro Area shocks account for the bulk of business cycle °uctuations.
The US
Table 6 and Table 7 below report results for the US regions from the same exercises we
performed for Euro Area's countries.
13
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h=0 h=1 h=3 h=5 h=0 h=1 h=3 h=5
NE 0.96 0.94 0.90 0.84 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.16
ME 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.14
GL 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16
PL 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.36 0.28 0.18 0.14
SE 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.20
SW 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.38
RM 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.24
FW 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.22 0.19 0.14 0.11
Table 7: Counterfactual correlations
TRUE Only US Only Region
Wide Shocks speci¯c Shocks
NE 0.85 0.97 0.03
ME 0.91 0.99 0.11
GL 0.93 0.99 0.11
PL 0.80 0.99 0.09
SE 0.96 0.98 0.15
SW 0.77 0.97 0.12
RM 0.81 0.99 0.08
FW 0.92 0.99 0.15
Results are similar to the European case, although in the US the size of idiosyncratic
shocks is more homogeneous across regions than it is for nations within the Euro Area.
Three results emerge: (i) the gaps are mainly explained by region speci¯c shocks in
particular at medium horizons; (ii) output °uctuations are mainly explained by the US
wide shocks at all horizons; (iii) correlations would have been quite high and stable
if there had only been US-wide shocks, suggesting that US wide shocks propagate
similarly across US regions.
3 The Euro Area and the world
So far we have concluded that (i) the global component of the Euro area countries
°uctuations is large, but that (ii) Euro Area countries seems to be more correlated
amongst themselves than with the rest of the world.
To explore further this point, in this Section, we will develop a simple statistical
model to understand the relation between the Euro Area considered as an aggregate
and the US as a whole. This analysis draws from Giannone and Reichlin (2005).
Let us ¯rst start with some descriptive statistics.
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the Center for Economic
Policy Research (CEPR) provide a chronology for, respectively, the US and the Euro
Area business cycle. In both cases the chronology is established by informal inspection
of a variety of key macroeconomic time series and it is not just based on GDP. The
dates refer to what is typically called the classical cycle, i.e. the turning points in the
level of economic activity. Figure 2 plots quarterly US and Euro Area GDP since 1970
(the ¯rst date for which aggregate euro statistics are available) and dates established
by CEPR and NBER.
NBER and CEPR dating illustrate striking similarities between the cyclical char-
acteristics of the two economies. In both economies, recessions are rare and of short
duration if compared with expansions and they are roughly synchronized.
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The light shadow corresponds to a recession in the US, the dark one to a recession in the
Euro Area and overlapping recessions show with an intermediate shade
We will now compute some descriptive statistics on duration, amplitude and syn-
chronization of cycles to document further similarities and di®erences between the
two business cycles. Table 8 reports statistics for the two classi¯cations of peaks and
troughs: the informal CEPR and NBER classi¯cation (bold ¯gures) and the dating re-
sulting from the application of the automatic algorithm designed by Bry and Boschan
(1971) to quarterly GDP9 (in parenthesis). Amplitude is measured as the quarterly
average growth rate of GDP during the sub-period, duration is measured in quarters
while the concordance index is a measure of synchronization developed by Harding
US
t and the log of Euro Area output
as yEU








t + (1 ¡ SyUS





is a binary random variable that takes the values unity during recessions and
zero during expansions. The concordance index ranges between 0 and 1.
The Table shows that, as suspected by inspection of Figure 2, there is high con-
cordance between the two cycles. However, in the US cyclical amplitude is larger and
9For the BB algorithm, we have applied the parametrization suggested by Harding and
Pagan (2002). We would like to stress that, following the tradition of Business Cycle dating,
quarterly GDP is not in per-capita for our dating exercise.
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and Pagan (2004). Calling the log of US GDP as yTable 8: Business Cycle Statistics
US Euro Area
peak to trough amplitude -0.5658 -0.2433
(-0.6294) (-0.4979)
trough to peak amplitude 0.9445 0.7653
(0.9589) (0.6254)
peak to trough duration 3.4000 5.3333
(3.4000) (2.5000)
trough to peak duration 23.25 29
(23.500) (35.00)




The business cycle statistics corresponding to the NBER and CEPR dating are in bold.
We show in parentheses the same statistics, produced by the Bry-Boschan Dating Algorithm.
recessions are shorter than in the Euro Area. In general, the Euro area cycle seems to
be smoother than the US one.
The analysis in terms of growth rates brings further insights on di®erences and
similarities between business cycles. Since the growth of output is typically stationary,
growth cycle characteristics can be illustrated by looking at volatility, persistence and
dynamic correlations.
Volatility is typically measured by the variance of the growth rate of the series.
This is an average of the variance at all frequencies and therefore captures short-run,
medium/long-run and business cycle variance. The medium/long run, persistent com-









t+j; i = EU;US
Persistence can hence be measured as the ratio between the volatility of the medium/long
run component and the total volatility. Table 9 reports the variance of the growth rates
of output, the variance of the medium/long run component and the ratio between the
latter and the former for both the Euro and the US economy. We can observe the
following characteristics:
1. Total output volatility is higher in the US than in the Euro area.
2. Medium/long run output volatility is similar in the US and in the Euro Area.
3. The Euro cycle is more persistent than the US cycle. Persistence, as measured
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total variance, is larger in the Euro Area.
Table 9: Variance of the growth rate of output and of its 5 year centered moving
average
US Euro Area
(a) var[¢y] 4.50 2.00
(b) var[MA5(¢y)] 0.55 0.40
(c)=(b)/(a) £100 12% 20%
Di®erences in volatility and persistence characteristics of growth cycles between the
US and the Euro Area are the same as what observed for level cycles based on amplitude
and duration statistics. Larger persistence in the Euro Area is not surprising, since
recessions, as we have seen, are less pronounced, but last longer than in the US.
What about synchronization?
Figure 3 plots growth rates of GDP per-capita (upper quadrant) and its 5-years
centered average (lower quadrant) corresponding. The plot shows the the Euro Area
growth seems to \follow" the US's: the persistent component of output growth in the
Euro Area is lagging the US analog.
To understand whether this leading-lagging pattern implies a predictive relation
between US growth and Euro Area growth, we run a simple Granger causality tests
between growth rates of each area and the Euro Area-US gaps.
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Figure 3: GDP growth rates and potential growth




















EUTable 10: Granger causality test
F stat. p-value
¢yUS













t does not Cause ¢yEU
t 5.20 0.01**
The F-test does not reject the hypothesis that the Euro Area-US gap does not
Granger-cause (and is not Granger-caused by) US output growth. In addition, the
F-test does not reject the hypothesis that Euro Area output growth rate does not
Granger-cause the Euro Area-US gap but it does reject the hypothesis of Granger
causality of the gap on the Euro Area growth rate (results are reported in Table 10).
These results suggest a Euro Area - US dynamics whereby the Euro area rate of
growth adjusts itself to the US growth while the US does not, suggesting that the US
economy does not respond to shocks speci¯c to the Euro Area10.
More speci¯cally, the stationarity of the Euro Area - US gap, which indicate that
US output and Euro output are cointegrated, suggests a bivariate model on US and
Euro output with one common permanent shock. In addition the Granger causality
results suggest that the long permanent shock cannot a®ect contemporaneously the
Euro Area while it can a®ect immediately the US. We can label this shock as US shock
































On the basis of this model we can now compute impulse response functions of the
Euro Area output and Euro Area-US gap. Figure 4 plots the impulse responses while
Table 11 shows the variance decompositions.
rope reacts slowly reaching the steady state after more than 5 years. Notice also that
the other shock, the Euro Area one, is small and transitory. It explains less that 50%
of the variance of forecast error at 1-year horizon and less than one-third at 3-years
horizon.
If the non-neutral common shock is interpreted as the world technology shock this
result implies that the US economy has a higher ability to absorb technology faster
than the Euro economy. The high rapidity with which technology is absorbed in the
10Giannone and Reichlin (2005) use the restriction implied by the Granger causality tests
to simulate levels of output and verify whether it is possible to reproduce the properties of
the dating of business cycle identi¯ed from the data (see Table 8). They ¯nd that the model
reproduces them with a large degree of accuracy.
18
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 595
March 2006
Results imply that after a worldwide shock the US adjusts immediately while Eu-
two shocks (the permanent, US, shock and the long-run neutral shock) on US output,Table 11: Real GDP per-capita: Forecast error decomposition% of forecast error
variance explained by the Worldwide (US) shock
Forecast horizon
0y 1y 3y 5y 10y
yUS
t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
yEU
t 0.35 0.62 0.85 0.92 0.96
yUS
t ¡ yEU
t 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Figure 4: Impulse responses









Impulse response to US shocks






















US seems to induce high short-term volatility. In the Euro Area, on the other hand,
the bulk of the variance is in the long-run because it takes longer to absorb shocks.
An alternative interpretation is that the world shock is in fact the US shock. The two
hypotheses cannot be distinguished statistically, but the economic implication of the
two alternative interpretations is the same.
To complete the exercise, we ask counter-factually, what would have the gap been
if there had only been worldwide shocks, and no Euro speci¯c shocks. Results are
reported in Figure 5.
We can see that the counterfactual and the actual gap are very similar. Moreover,
the gap decreases in recessions and increases in expansion which further illustrate our
characterizations of the two business cycles.
Collecting all results, we can conclude:
² The world-wide/US shock explains most of the °uctuations of the gap as already
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noticed by the literature on the world business cycle cited before.
² During recessions, the gap tends to close since Europe reacts slowly to the world-
wide shock. The gap opens during the expansions. In the middle of the cycle it
reaches its maximum, but then Europe starts caching up; and
² The Euro Area shock reduced the gap during the US recession of the 1990s,
probably as a result of the German Uni¯cation. However, the Euro Area shock
only postponed the European recession. Apart for this episode, the recent period
is very much in line with past experience (the variance of European speci¯c shocks
has not increased); and
² There is a speci¯c Euro Area cycle, which is di®erent from the US cycle because
of the di®erent propagation mechanism. This quali¯es the result by Canova et al.
(2004) and by Monfort et al. (2004) by distinguishing between origin of the shock
(worldwide) and propagation mechanism (Euro Area speci¯c).
4 Business cycle asymmetries and risk sharing:
should we care about output synchronization?
So far we have focused on the analysis of output and output per capita and we have not
looked at changes in these characteristics during the process of European integration
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at least not yet, of changes in the cyclical characteristics of the Euro Area.
In this section we will ask the question of whether the cross-country correlations
of consumption, conditionally on output have changed as the result of the deepen-
ing of the European economic integration. What matters for welfare is consumption
rather than output. In principle, ¯nancial market integration, should make it easier
for consumers, to insure against income risk through borrowing and lending and cross-
country ownership of ¯nancial assets. Sorensen and Yosha (1998) found that less risk
is shared in Europe than in the US while Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2004) found that risk
sharing through ¯nancial market has increased in the last decade thanks to ¯nancial
integration.
Table 12 shows some descriptive statistics.







71-03 71-89 93-03 71-03 71-89 93-03 71-03 71-89 93-03
AT 1.96 2.59 1.30 3.23 3.52 1.56 0.63 0.53 0.43
BE 1.10 1.74 0.41 3.25 4.53 0.65 0.82 0.81 0.65
FI 5.29 2.28 0.68 6.66 2.49 0.59 0.46 0.45 0.38
FR 0.70 0.67 0.41 1.49 1.69 0.75 0.78 0.80 0.69
GE 0.83 0.98 0.30 2.64 2.75 0.97 0.83 0.80 0.84
GR 4.24 6.59 1.52 5.91 9.11 0.53 0.53 0.54 -0.46
IE 8.75 9.27 2.98 9.74 12.48 5.00 0.33 0.54 0.79
IT 1.56 2.05 0.27 3.35 2.68 0.66 0.73 0.54 0.78
LU 4.49 0.86 1.44 5.50 1.78 1.75 0.44 0.75 0.43
NL 2.19 2.43 0.82 3.18 4.35 1.80 0.57 0.67 0.78
PT 10.27 16.55 1.49 13.36 20.50 2.98 0.51 0.49 0.81
SP 2.12 3.28 0.36 4.51 6.47 1.08 0.74 0.74 0.82
EU12 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.59 1.60 0.51 1.00 1.00 1.00
DE 3.59 3.65 2.71 2.83 4.01 1.72 0.19 0.39 -0.25
SE 3.63 3.83 1.42 4.63 4.54 1.80 0.48 0.43 0.46
UK 3.66 3.94 0.32 3.52 4.82 0.50 0.31 0.45 0.68
EU15 0.12 0.13 0.01 1.36 1.55 0.44 0.96 0.96 0.99
US 2.84 3.11 0.25 2.52 3.38 0.71 0.32 0.40 0.81
CA 2.86 2.40 0.67 3.55 4.18 0.53 0.48 0.65 0.36
JP 2.45 2.78 1.74 3.40 4.10 0.66 0.55 0.57 -0.49
OECD 0.76 0.69 0.21 1.16 1.58 0.35 0.73 0.78 0.77
Although the variance of consumption has been declining over time for all countries,
the correlation of country consumption growth with the average has increased for some
countries and decreased for others.
These numbers, however, cannot be simply interpreted: they are driven by many
factors, such as taste shocks for example. A more interpretable measure of risk sharing
can be obtained following Asdrubali et al. (1996), ASY from now on. We ask how
much variance of output is smoothed by consumption via risk sharing at each period
of time (see Sorensen and Yosha, 1998; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2004, for an analysis
on European countries), i.e. how much the cross-country variance of consumption
conditional on output has decreased over time. We consider the sample 1970-2004 and
redo some of ASY's calculations on our data.
Let us de¯ne: ci
t the log £100 of real individual consumption of country i in year
t. We estimate (by OLS) the regression:
¢h(ci
t ¡ cEU
t ) = ®t + ¯t¢h(yi
t ¡ yEU
t ) + vt
where ¢h denotes the h-th di®erences (1 ¡ Lh). The regression coe±cient ¯t is inter-
preted as the amount of risk not insured, i.e. the percentage of the variance of GDP
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Figure 6 plots a smooth version of ¯t in time and for the EU12 countries excluding












and m = 5 years.
Figure 6: Risk not shared over time







% of unsmoothed variance at different horizons
h=1
h=5
Results show that the ability of sharing risk among European countries goes up in
the early 90's when capital and good market integration has signi¯cantly accelerated
in Europe.
Although the previous calculations provide an interesting rough descriptive statis-
tics, a better measure of risk sharing should control for country heterogeneity in re-
sponse to common, Area-wide shocks and for the e®ect of relative prices. The hetero-
geneity of the responses of countries output and consumption to common shocks could
emerge in case of imperfect risk sharing11. In addition, relative prices °uctuations,
whose nature has changed signi¯cantly with the EMU, could have provided an auto-
matic smoothing of the e®ect of country speci¯c shocks12 (see for example Obstfeld,
11This approach to control for heterogeneity has been proposed by Giannone and Lenza
(2004).
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t is the real exchange rate between country i and the Euro Area as a whole13
and Euro-area wide consumption is included as a regressor to control for common taste
shocks.
We follow ASY and estimate it using weighted least square so as to downweight
countries with a larger idiosyncratic component. We run the regression on all Euro Area
countries, excluding Luxembourg. As an alternative, we also estimate the coe±cients
including in our panel only the six largest Euro Area countries (Germany, France, Italy,
Spain, Netherlands and Belgium). Table 13 reports results.
Table 13: Panel estimates of ¯h for selected subsamples
EU 12 (excl. LU) EU (Largest 6)
h=1 h=5 h=1 h=5
1970-2003 0.75 (0.05) 0.77 (0.03) 0.83 (0.07) 0.94 (0.04)
1970-1989 0.80 (0.08) 0.87 (0.04) 0.86 (0.09) 0.91 (0.05)
1990-2003 0.65 (0.07) 0.59 (0.03) 0.70 (0.10) 0.65 (0.08)
1993-2003 0.76 (0.10) 0.59 (0.03) 0.77 (0.12) 0.63 (0.15)
Results from the simple measure of risk sharing are con¯rmed: risk sharing has
increased in the last decade. The result is particularly robust at long horizons, indi-
cating that the increased ability of countries to smooth is particularly signi¯cant in
response to persistent shocks to output. We should also stress that long horizons re-
sults should be more robust to endogeneity issues that may a®ect these types of reduced
form regressions.
We take the results above as an indication that the process of European integration
is working and we should worry less than before about asymmetries in output.
5 Conclusions
Six years of history of a monetary union are too short to identify new tendencies of
output development since historically gaps GDP per capita have been persistent and
it is di±cult to distinguish trends from persistent °uctuations around di®erent means.
However, these gaps are small and cycles are synchronized.
Heterogeneity is generated by small and persistent idiosyncratic shocks while most


















t are the nominal
consumption and the real consumption, respectively, in country i expressed in US dollars.
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output and, for the small part of variance generated by idiosyncratic shocks, they should
be designed to address low frequency components rather than the business cycle which
is mostly common.
What should be a concern for policy is the common characteristic of the European
cycle. When the Euro Area is analyzed as an aggregate and compared with the US, it
is found that, although a common world shock drives the two cycles, the propagation
di®ers across the two areas: the Euro Area lags the US and its cycle is more persistent,
but less volatile. Low growth, persistence of shocks and low volatility are common
characteristics of the Euro area and the gap with respect to the US has been stable
over the last thirty years.
Facing these historical characteristics, the process of European integration, has
however helped to smooth the cross-sectional correlation of consumption conditional
on output. This ¯nding supports the hypothesis that, since the early nineties, risk
sharing has increased within the Euro Area.
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March 2006Discussion of: \Trends and cycles in the Euro area: how much heterogene-
ity and should we worry about it?" by Domenico Giannone and Lucrezia
Reichlin
Bent E. S¿rensen, University of Houston
Giannone and Reichlin's (GR) paper analyzes output °uctuations and their persis-
tence and transmission for EU and EMU countries over the last 30 years. GR also
examine if output levels are converging and compare to U.S. state-level data. These
are important questions for a monetary union. For example, if inequality were to in-
crease, less fortunate countries might blame monetary policy and, as more universally
discussed in the literature, °uctuations in output pose a challenge for economic policy
if shocks are not synchronized (\asymmetric"). This is particularly true if shocks are
persistent and if they are large|at least as long as they are not \insured" through in-
ternational risk sharing. Therefore, GR further estimate the amount of macroeconomic
risk sharing in the EU|that is, the degree to which a country's consumption is bu®ered
from country-speci¯c output shocks. (I refer to the di®erence between country-level
and EU-level variables as \country-speci¯c" or \idiosyncratic.")
The main results of the paper are as follows.
1. Output levels are not converging in Europe, with the exception of the remarkable
catch-up of Ireland's output|but they are clearly not diverging either. U.S.
regions display a similar pattern.
2. The variance of output growth rates has declined steeply and so has the variance
of idiosyncratic growth rates.
3. Business cycles in Europe are more persistent but also more shallow than in the
United States.
4. The U.S. business cycle leads the European business cycle.
5. The variance of consumption growth has decreased sharply.
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I will discuss the ¯ndings in turn.
1 Convergence of output
It is interesting that output convergence seems to have come to a halt in the EU as
well as among U.S. states. The neoclassical model predicts that output levels should
converge when capital markets integrate ceteris paribus as capital moves to the regions
where it has previously been scarce. In particular, the ceteris paribus clause includes
the restriction that labor is homogeneous and endowments and productivity levels are
similar. Such convergence was going on in Europe (and in the United States) before
the 1980s so an interesting issue is why it has stopped? My interpretation is that
labor and endowments (very broadly interpreted) di®er between between U.S. states.
Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, S¿rensen, and Yosha (2005) (KRSY) ¯nd that the behavior of
U.S. state-level output and income is consistent with capital freely moving across state
borders to states where it is most productive. It is less obvious if capital markets in
the EU or EMU are integrated to the extent of within-U.S. integration, but the similar
patterns of convergence are suggestive that this is the case. The behavior of the Irish
economy appears consistent with the picture of an economy that is fully integrated in
world capital markets, but it is still a somewhat open question if such is the case for
the average EU country.
One serious complaint: income is not output as GR implicitly assume when they
compare U.S. income convergence with European output convergence. The overall
picture of convergence patterns likely doesn't change much although the di®erence
between output and income can be very large for oil states, in particular Alaska. The
di®erence also varies systematically with the business cycle. KRSY, in fact, show how
the deviation of state-level income from output systematically change with state-level
growth. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 1 (taken from KRSY) that displays growth
rates and the ratio of output to income for U.S. regions. In the ¯gure the growth rate
and the output to income ratio are both displayed as the ratio to the U.S. average and
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growth rate or a ratio higher than the U.S. average. Figure 1 shows how New England
income consistently has been higher than output and how the di®erence declines during
the period of high growth in the late 1980s. KRSY interprets this as evidence of fully
integrated capital markets: if capital °ows into New England from other states during
the period of high growth, income will fall relatively to output as the return to capital
now partly accrues to other states. The pattern of high growth being associated with a
decline in the ratio of output to income is very robust. As another example, the pattern
for the South West is more or less mirror-image to New England, but it is striking how
much larger output is than income in this region: in the early 1980s output is about 20
percent higher than income, which means that the negative gap show in GR's Table 2
for this region would be a positive gap had they used output data.
2 Decline in output volatility
The decline in output volatility is striking. This decline, to the extent it is permanent,
makes international risk sharing less important. Kalemli-Ozcan, S¿rensen, and Yosha
(2001) derive a simple expression for the potential welfare improvement from moving
from no risk sharing to perfect risk sharing within a group of countries. While I refer
the reader to this paper for the details it is intuitive that the gain from risk sharing
is higher the higher is the idiosyncratic variance of output but the measure is also
inversely related to the covariance of idiosyncratic output with aggregate output.1 I
present some numbers calculated using this measure of asymmetry in Table 1.
The interpretation of the numbers is that a value of, say, 5, implies that a repre-
sentative EMU consumer would be willing to forego 5 percent of consumption in all
future in return for the lower variance of output in the perfect risk sharing allocation.
This number varies by country but Table 1 only displays the average across countries.
The order of magnitude is dependent on parameters such as the coe±cient of relative
1The perfect risk sharing allocation is a market allocation where a country with output that is
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Sample 1974{1983 1984{1993 1994{2003
11 EMU countries 1.44 1.41 0.64
EMU minus Finland 1.32 0.84 0.44
EMU minus Greece 1.33 1.30 0.69
EMU minus Portugal & Greece 1.15 1.35 0.72
EMU minus Ireland 1.25 1.33 0.53
Note: Luxembourg is atypically small and is left out. The numbers can be interpreted
as the percent of permanent consumption that an \average" resident of the EMU coun-
tries would willingly give up in order to obtain the reduction in variability associated
with perfect risk sharing.
risk aversion and the discount factor and the results are only suggestive of orders of
magnitude. The results are shown for a selection of subsets of EMU countries in order
to highlight if average asymmetry is caused by certain countries. It is apparent that
asymmetry is larger in the 1970s when Portugal and Greece are included as might
be expected. Finland su®ered very large declines in GDP after the break-up of the
Soviet Union and Finland therefore impact very strongly on average asymmetry in the
1984-1993 period and to some extent still in the 1994-2003 period where the inclusion
of Ireland also has a notable e®ect. Nonetheless, the calculations robustly con¯rm that
asymmetry in the EU in the last decade has become much less of an issue implying
that risk sharing between the countries in the EU is not a very important issue if this
level of asymmetry persists. However, it may well not. GR leave out the period 1990{
1992 from their calculations, a period where asymmetry was particularly high. GR
argue that German uni¯cation might distort the numbers during this period, which
was also a period of banking crises in Sweden and Finland. For a discussion of risk
sharing, I think leaving out volatile periods is exactly what we should not do: risk
sharing arrangements may not be important in \normal times" but may be of cru-
cial importance during crisis periods. My time series of year-by-year (estimated) risk
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risk sharing is lower. (Meaning that a smaller fraction of output shocks are smoothed,
although the absolute Euro-amounts involved may be larger in crisis periods.)
3 U.S. versus European business cycles
GR document, using time series methods, that EU business cycles have been longer and
shallower than U.S. business cycles and that the U.S. business cycle seems to lead the
European business cycle. I ¯nd the results informative although the ¯tting of a time
series model is somewhat problematic because the volatility patterns discussed above
indicate that the stochastic process governing output is changing over time, while the
model assumes the process follows a distribution that is constant over time. It is a
little hard to guess how much this a®ects conclusions. Probably not too much, but
I still ¯nd it very good that GR consider a large selection of indicators, rather than
solely relying on the time series model.
What worries me more are the details of GR's interpretation. For example, it
is claimed that \shocks" to U.S. GDP propagate to EU countries with a lag; and
occasionally GR even use the term \exogenous" shocks. It has to be kept in mind that
the time series methods applied only identify temporal patterns and the test for Granger
causality that GR apply only can identify whether U.S. GDP typically changes before
European GDP but has nothing to say about causality. To take a simple parable. In
Northern Europe rain usually moves in from the Atlantic. It therefore rains in England
before it rains in France and a Granger causality test would show that \rain in England"
causes \rain in France," but the reason for rain in France is really evaporation over the
Caribbean and the movement of low pressure systems across the Atlantic. Why the
United States tends to experience movements in GDP before Europe is not answered by
GR's analysis. What is a \shock" to GDP as they measure it? The time series model
simply \picks" as the \shock," the change in GDP not predicted by past variables.
I think what drives the results could be something like this: technological advances
(say, the internet) cause a wave of investment and growth, the United States has an
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before that of Europe, but after a year or two, the new technology gets implemented
in Europe. Much more research is needed to verify whether such a pattern is typical,
but the point I am raising is this: such a model would lead to the time series pattern
that GR interpret as \shocks occur in the United States and propagate to Europe"
but in \my" story there was no \propagation," only a slower technology adoption in
Europe. And, in the case where the United States su®ers a literal shock due to, say,
a major hurricane, then there may or may not be reason to believe that such a shock
would actually \propagate." One could think of reasons why it might: spill-overs from
demand, price-e®ects from changes in nominal exchange rates, etc. but, again, time
series patterns such as those identi¯ed by GR cannot tell us.
Overall, I ¯nd the methods used by GR to measure temporal patterns in GDP
useful and I studied the results with interest. My quibbles is simply with the language
applied because GR's results are not very informative about causality or about whether
changes in, say, U.S. GDP will propagate to Europe in the case where such shocks have
di®erent causes from those of the 1990s.
4 Risk Sharing
GR show that consumption risk sharing increased steeply from the 1980s to the 1990s.
Their smoothed ¯gure shows that the increase happened during the early years of the
1990s while a slight down-tick is visible in the late 1990s where ¯nancial markets were
integrating fast. In my experience, consumption based measures of risk sharing a often
noisy although such noise gets reduced by considering risk sharing over longer intervals
and GR ¯nd quite similar patterns using 5-year intervals. I would like to supplement
the picture with estimates of \income risk sharing," namely measures of how much
country-level GNP is smoothed. Countries, like individuals, can smooth consumption
for a period of time relying on borrowing and lending, but long lasting shocks cannot
be hedged inde¯nitely through lending. If GNP is smoothed through returns on assets
such as portfolio holdings and foreign direct investment, such smoothing is more likely
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EU countries in the 1980s was due to pro-cyclical saving of, in particular, governments
while GNP was not smoothed.2 In Figure 2, I show the evolution of GNP smoothing
for some selections of EMU countries. Interestingly, GNP smoothing has increased
from nothing to a signi¯cant amount only during the last decade and if Ireland is
dropped from the sample even the most recent years display very modest smoothing
of GNP. It is striking how the crisis in Finland in the early 1990s lead to negative
income smoothing. Technically, this ¯nding re°ects that GNP in Finland fell even
further than GDP during the crisis. Why this happened is not well understood. From
Figure 2 it can be observed, as earlier alluded to, that risk sharing declined during the
recessions around 1981, 1991, and 2001. (Actually, this seems to happen with a slight
lag, for unknown reasons.) Overall, the trend in GNP-smoothing is clearly upwards
and I believe that this is a direct result of the rapid diversi¯cation of international asset
portfolios that started in earnest in the mid 1990s. Consistent with this, S¿rensen, Wu,
Zhu, and Yosha (2005) demonstrate that the degree of smoothing of GNP over time
and across countries is highly correlated with the relative size of countries' international
asset portfolios.
Figure 3 shows the corresponding ¯gure for consumption smoothing. The numbers
in this ¯gure would be (approximately) equal to one minus the ¯gures in GR's Figure 6
had the samples been identical. My ¯gure, similarly to GR, reveals a large increase
in consumption risk sharing around the beginning of the 1990s, but by including the
1970s we see that there is more to the story: consumption risk sharing was at its
highest in the 1970s! This is a somewhat surprising ¯nding and it probably re°ects a
non-recurring response of governments to the ¯rst oil crisis, although it will take me
much too far a¯eld to try and verify that conjecture. However, in my view it illustrates
that consumption based measures of risk sharing can be temporarily \o®" for a while.3
Overall, the temporal pattern of consumption risk sharing is quite similar to that found
2S¿rensen and Yosha (1998) ¯nd that pro-cyclical corporate saving provides signi¯cant consumption
smoothing at the annual frequency but not at longer intervals.
3Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996) (ASY) ¯nd for U.S. states that the estimated amount
of consumption smoothing changes in unexplained ways from decade to decade while the estimated
amount of income smoothing monotonically increases as one would expect as ¯nancial markets deepen.
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1990s is clearly visible. The inclusion of Ireland seems to impact on the results mainly
in the ¯rst years of the new millennium.
My ¯nal comment is about the last risk sharing regression performed by GR. GR
regress the idiosyncratic change in consumption on the idiosyncratic change in output.
This is the risk sharing measure suggested by ASY. They then include variables, such
as aggregate EU output and the real exchange rate, on the right hand side of the
regression. I ¯nd this hard to interpret: a positive coe±cient to the exchange rate
implies that a high exchange rate leads to high consumption growth. Interesting, but
what has this to do with risk sharing? I think the regression that one might want to
run is one where the amount of risk sharing is allowed to change with variables such
as exchange rates. (Since neither regression is structural there is, of course, room for
disagreement about what is more informative.) Using GR's notation, I have in mind a













+ ²it : (1)
If one wants to allow for risk sharing to depend on exchange rates, aggregate con-
sumption, etc. one should, in my view, simply allow for ¯t to be a time-varying
coe±cient, itself a function of the relevant variables. For simplicity, consider the case
where ¯t is suspected to vary with a variable Xit and with time. One can then simply
let
¯t = ¯0 + ¯1 (t ¡ ¹ t) + ¯2 (X
i
t ¡ Xt); (2)
where Xt is the average of X over countries for ¯xed t. ¯0 will then measure the average
amount of risk sharing while, e.g., ¯2 will be informative about whether risk sharing
is a function of the variable X. Melitz and Zumer (1999) ¯rst suggested letting the
risk sharing measure be a function of country-level variables and S¿rensen, Wu, Zhu,
and Yosha (2005) further extend this approach by letting the estimated risk sharing
estimate vary across time and across countries. In my view, such a measure (1 ¡ ¯t)
has a \clean" interpretation as measuring risk sharing as a function of other variables,
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after somehow subtracting the e®ect of certain regressors on the growth of idiosyncratic
consumption.
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1 the paper: “Trends and cycles in the euro area: how much heterogeneity 
should we worry about? by D. Giannone and L. Reichlin presented at the ECB Workshop 
“What effects is EMU having on the euro area and its member countries?”, 16-17 June 
2005 
This paper raises many interesting issues, which I am sure will give rise to a stimulating 
discussion. In view of Bent Sørensen’s focus on the comparison between euro-area and US 
business cycles and on risk sharing, I have opted to concentrate on the main findings of the 
paper in terms business cycle synchronisation across the euro-area Member States. 
I shall begin by placing the paper’s results in the context of the recent literature on business 
cycle synchronisation in the euro area, before turning to specific comments on these results.  
There has been much discussion in theoretical and empirical literature on the linkages 
between economic integration and the degree of co-movement of business cycles. Economic 
theory is not clear on whether economic integration will lead to more or less synchronisation 
of business cycles. Some strands of international trade theory suggest that the removal of 
trade barriers leads to greater regional specialisation of economic activities (more inter-trade) 
and, accordingly, greater vulnerability to idiosyncratic shocks (less synchronisation). Others 
focus on increasing intra-trade, exposing countries to greater likelihood of a common shock 
and increased synchronisation. Yet other fields of theory focus on the financial channel rather 
than the trade channel. Under this channel, greater capital market integration would allow 
more specialisation in production structures and therefore less synchronisation of business 
cycles. 
There is still no definitive answer on what determines or hinders co-movement. For example, 
an overview of various empirical papers presented at the ECFIN Research Conference 
“Business Cycles and Growth in Europe”, in October 2004
2 reveals that there is no conclusive 
evidence of an increased synchronisation of business cycles across Member States with the 
creation of EMU or even including the pre-EMU “convergence phase” of the ERM. The 
results depend on various factors, including the type of data used (e.g. monthly industrial 
productions data or quarterly GDP data) as well as on the cycle-dating algorithms employed 
to isolate the stylized facts on business cycles (classical or growth-deviation identification of 
the cycles) and the various techniques used to evaluate the degree of synchronicity of cycles. 
And, indeed, where increased synchronisation of cycles among euro-area countries appears to 
be supported by the analysis, it is not clear whether this is due to a specifically euro-area 
business cycle or due to globalisation.
3  
Giannone and Reichlin, using per capita GDP data for euro-area countries for the period 
1970-2003, present the following findings:  
1) There is evidence of persistence of output-per-capita gaps of Member States vis-à-vis the 
euro-area average (data period: 1970-2003), with no change evident in the last decade (apart 
from Ireland and Spain, possibly due to convergence dynamics); 
2) A similar picture prevails for the eight regions of the US, using data on personal income 
per capita (also 1970-2003); 
                                                 
1   The author, Mary McCarthy, works in the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of 
the European Commission. The views expressed are not necessarily shared by the European Commission. 
2   See European Economy – Economic Paper 227 (vol. 1 and 2): Proceedings of the 2004 first annual DG 
ECFIN research conference on “Business Cycles and Growth in Europe” at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers227_en.htm  
3   See, for example, Artis (2005), which suggests that the euro-area grouping is not a distinctive one. 
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persistent than the country-specific or regional gaps; and  
4) Very similar cycles exist across the euro-area (based on the classical reference cycle). 
They explain long-run asymmetries and cyclical symmetries across the euro area by reference 
to the following: 
a) large and persistent effects of country-specific shocks on the gap of each country vis-à-vis 
the euro area; 
b) common euro-area shocks, which account for the major part of business cycle fluctuations; 
and  
c) similar propagation mechanisms of area-wide shocks to individual countries. 
 
Specific comments 
1.  The finding of persistent output-per-capita gaps to the euro-area average seems to be 
well supported by the evidence. An analysis of the ranking of euro-area countries by growth 
rate achieved over the past fifteen years reveals that the relative growth ranking of countries 
has remained fairly stable in the post-1999 period (chart 1), with some exceptions.  
 

















In general, countries that were characterised by above-average growth in the last six years had 
usually been in this position already in the early or late 1990s. One can discern a few 
important changes that have influenced the relative ranking of countries and, accordingly, 
growth dispersion. One such example is Germany, where unification-boosted over-
performance turned into underperformance. Another is France, which improved its position 
from below average to above average in the time frame considered. France also grew at a 
faster pace than Germany in every year since 1996, on average by nearly one percentage 
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source of growth over the last five years. Other changes in the ranking should also be noted. 
These include the movement of Finland from the bottom of the group in 1991-1998 to fifth 
from the top in the last six years. On the other hand, Portugal and the Netherlands have 
slipped from being well above average in the second half of the nineties to lagging behind 
most other countries in the past few years. 
Apart from the reference to “convergence dynamics” as an explanatory factor for the 
performance of Spain and Ireland, the authors do not consider the reasons behind the 
persistence in output gaps to the euro-area average. Could the results be related to (the lack 
of) “structural reforms”?  In view of the Lisbon Agenda, it would be interesting, from the 
policy viewpoint and for assessing whether “heterogeneity” matters (more below), to 
investigate whether the phenomenon could be linked to structural factors. It would also be 
useful to consider whether the results are any different for “cohesion fund” countries. 
Analysis carried out by the research department of DG Economic and Financial Affairs
4 
(European Commission) sheds some light on the sources of long-term growth differences 
across euro-area Member States. Table 1 shows the sources of potential GDP growth. The 
decomposition of the variance in potential output across Member States, inferred from this 
table, shows that variations in the labour input still constitute the most important factor 
explaining over 50% of differences in potential output across euro-area Member States, with 
total factor productivity in second place (35%). 
 
Labour Capital TFP Labour Capital TFP
B E 2 . 20 . 40 . 80 . 92 . 10 . 60 . 51 . 0
D E 1 . 50 . 10 . 70 . 71 . 10 . 20 . 40 . 5
E L 2 . 90 . 51 . 01 . 43 . 40 . 41 . 41 . 5
E S 3 . 01 . 71 . 20 . 13 . 32 . 01 . 30 . 0
F R 2 . 00 . 60 . 60 . 82 . 20 . 70 . 60 . 8
I E 8 . 12 . 81 . 73 . 56 . 62 . 11 . 72 . 7
I T 1 . 50 . 30 . 70 . 61 . 70 . 80 . 70 . 2
L U 5 . 21 . 11 . 92 . 24 . 41 . 11 . 81 . 5
N L 2 . 81 . 30 . 80 . 71 . 90 . 80 . 60 . 5
A T 2 . 30 . 31 . 01 . 01 . 90 . 30 . 80 . 8
P T 2 . 70 . 81 . 50 . 41 . 70 . 70 . 90 . 1
F I 3 . 20 . 60 . 32 . 43 . 30 . 70 . 42 . 2
Euro Area 2.0 0.6 0.8 0.6 1.9 0.7 0.6 0.6
Source: Commission  services











2.  Let me now turn to the issue of cyclical symmetries across euro-area Member States 
and some possibly counterfactual evidence (to stable synchronisation) in the recent cycle.  
The title of this conference is “What effects is EMU having on the euro area and its member 
countries?” However, the time frame poses particular problems for the assessment of business 
cycle synchronisation since EMU, as we have only six years of evidence and approximately 
                                                 
4   See Denis et al. (2002) and (2005). 
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present paper, uses data up to the end of 2003, i.e. barely into the expansionary phase of the 
current cycle. However, it is particularly the experience in the period since the turnaround in 
the middle of 2003 that has given rise to recent concerns about increased growth dispersion 
across Member States. 
An analysis of the recent data
5 reveals the following results concerning GDP growth during 
different recoveries in the euro area:  
•  the current recovery appears to be weaker than the average of four past recoveries at 
the same stage of the cycle (chart 2); 
•  increased dispersion of quarterly growth rates (five largest Member States) in this 
recovery compared to previous recoveries (chart 3);  
•  increased dispersion of the output gap in the four largest Member States (chart 4); and  
•  increased dispersion in 2004 (chart 5). 
 
Chart 2:  The evolution of GDP in the euro area during different recoveries in the euro area
Source: Commission services

















average four previous recoveries
Quarters from trough
GDP ( index=100 at trough) pps.
 
                                                 
5   See Paternoster (2005). 
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March 2006Chart 3:  Dispersion of real GDP growth in the current and past recoveries (five largest euro-
area Member States)
Source: Commission services
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March 2006Chart 5:  Quarterly GDP growth since the first quarter of 2004
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Analysis of data on quarterly growth rates reveals that, although cyclical dispersion has 
remained quite low in the past few years in the euro area as whole, disparities in cyclical 
positions between the (four or five) larger Member States have increased steadily. Output gap 
dispersion across Germany, France, Italy and Spain has increased markedly since 2003 and 
now stands at its highest level since the start of stage III of EMU in 1999.  
Looking behind the diverging growth performances, we find disparities in the sources of 
growth across Member States. Until quite recently in this recovery, Germany has relied 
mainly on exports as the engine of growth, while domestic demand has stagnated. On the 
other hand, domestic demand has underpinned the robust economic performance in Spain and 
has been the main factor sustaining growth in France (also until recently).  
This leads us to consider developments in the competitive positions of Member States. Charts 
6 and 7 highlight: the deterioration in competitiveness of Italy, Spain, France together with 
the gains made by Germany; and the cumulated loss in export market shares of Greece, Italy, 
Finland and France. 
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3.  Should we be worried about heterogeneity and the apparent increase in dispersion in 
this upswing? 
Under the Optimum Currency Area literature, the synchronisation of business cycles is 
necessary for the successful implementation of a common monetary policy. However, for a 
common policy, it is not only the synchronisation of the cycles that matters but also the 
amplitude of the cycles across Member States, since from the vantage point of the individual 
country, the policy intensity should be ideally tailored to the amplitude of the cycle. One also 
has to bear in mind the quite divergent sources of growth in individual Member States 
(mentioned above). This poses questions about the need for adjustment of real exchange rates 
in EMU, which could also have implications for the amplitude of the cycle. 
In this context, it would be interesting to hear more from the authors about the evolution of 
amplitude of the cycle across individual Member States and the sources of any divergence in 
amplitude. Indeed, some empirical studies (Bergman, 2005) have argued that the dispersion in 
amplitude has increased since the creation of EMU. 
Does this really matter for the euro area? I would argue that it depends on whether it is 
smaller countries or larger countries are the source of the problem. The four largest countries 
(Germany, France, Italy and Spain) account for almost 80% of the euro-area GDP. And at 
present, as the charts I have shown demonstrate, the largest growth dispersion has recently 
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